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MONISM AND MATERIALISM.
A REJOINDER.
BY PAUL R. SHIPMAN.
Dr. Carus has replied, through one of the two me-
diums of publication at his command, to certain cri-
ticisms of mine, which, I regret to say, have not ap-
peared in either of these mediums ; if they had, I
should be content to let his reply pass without a re-
joinder. As it is, I ask permission to make one.
I said that the monism of Dr. Carus "sets duality
in the atom, and runs it throughout existence " ; and,
in proof of this, cited his assertion that " feeling is not
material," that "motion can never be transformed
into feeling," that "the interconvertibility of motion
and feeling is an error," that the "non-mechanical
has nothing whatever to do with the mechanical," that
feeling "can impart no impulse," that "the motions
of all atoms are accompanied with elements of feeling,"
that these elements of feeling "produce in certain
combinations actual feelings," and so forth, to the end
of a long chapter. In reply, Dr. Carus asks, inno-
cently : "Did I ever speak of the duality of atoms?"
Not that I know of ; I certainly never said he did. I
simply showed that his multiform assertion of the im-
materiality of the elements of feeling, and of their in-
timate and inseparable coexistence with all atoms,
means this or nothing.
Of this showing, however, Dr. Carus has taken no
notice. He has not disputed my citations or endea-
vored to confute my arguments. He has made no
further attempt to explain how two things, which he
says have nothing whatever to do with each other, and
consequently nothing in common, can be one. What
he might do, if he tried, I will not conjecture. Per-
haps, more potent than Gratiano, he might rail or rally
the seal from off the bond—the words from out the
printed page ; but, till he does, he will pardon me for
saying that, like Gratiano, he but offends his lungs to
speak so loud.
Dr. Carus also asks, with like ingenuousness, if he
ever declared, as I accused him of declaring, that
"consciousness is immaterial and will material." He
does not disown the declaration, to which my accu-
sation refers, that consciousness is immaterial, and
that will is motion, but claims, it seems, that motion,
as well as consciousness, is immaterial. Such being
his view, how is it (will he tell us ?) that motion can
act on matter, and that consciousness can not—that
consciousness, as he asserts, "can impart no im-
pulse," whilst motion, as he will admit, is a living
spring of impulse ? Is the immaterial convertible with
the material, and not with the immaterial ? Or are
there degrees of immateriality, and does a chasm,
fathomless and spanless, divide the scale—sundering
one of these degrees from the rest, as all of them are
sundered from materiality? But this by the way. The
question of the materiality of motion I will discuss
presently in connection with the nature of properties.
It pleases Dr. Carus to imply, what he cannot seri-
ously mean, that I hold materialism in the form im-
agined by some of his philosophical countrymen in the
first half of this century, and he addresses himself par-
ticularly to confuting the dictum (as if it concerned
me) that thought is a secretion of the brain, saying on
this head, among other things, equally irrelevant,
though not all equally decorous :
" Gall is a substance, but thought is not a substance. Gall is
a special kind of organised matter, but thought is no matter. If it
were, we might bottle it, or preserve it in tin cans. What a fine
prospect to buy canned thought at the grocers ! "
It is enough to say of this infirm logic, and super-
annuated pleasantry, not to speak of either irreverently,
that thought, while not a secretion, figuratively or
literally, is nevertheless the effect of the activity of or-
ganised matter ; and, as every effect is consubstantial
with its cause, the effect of material activity is itself
material. "Nothing is immaterial, and everything is
material," says the article to which Dr. Carus is re-
plying, " that has anything to do with matter ; what-
ever acts on matter, or is acted on by matter, is ma-
terial—everything else, provided there is anything else,
is immaterial." If this account of the material is true,
mind unquestionably is material, and in this relation
the sole remaining problem—no doubt a stupendous
and superb one—is to trace the processes that emerge
in consciousness. And the truth of this account re-
sults, necessarily, from the nature of causation, joined
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with the principle that action and reaction are equal
and opposite.
Matter can neither act nor be acted on without re-
action, which includes interaction, confessedly pos-
sible between material agents only. But mental phe-
nomena, it is now admitted, spring from the interaction
of subject and object ; both of which are thereby ad-
mitted to be material. From the character of knowl-
edge, thus derived, it follows that what knows must
be the same in nature as what is known ; "this was
some time a paradox, but now the time gives it proof."
The whole superstructure of modern psychology is
founded implicitly on the materiality of mind.
Furthermore, the materiality of mind is proved by
the coextension of matter with reality, as guaranteed
by the absolute impossibility of conceiving the nega-
tion of this proposition; out of which flows the corol-
lary that mind is a form of matter, since nothing but
the mysterious something that we call matter exists
—
nothing but matter in one or another of its infinite
modes.
Moreover, the materiality of mind is proved in-
ductively ;—first, by the fact that consciousness is in-
variably and unconditionally consequent on the action
of material forces ; and, secondly, by the fixed corre-
spondence of the variations in consciousness with de-
terminate variations in material forces : each of which,
if there is validity in the axioms of science, proves
that consciousness is the effect of material forces, and,
consequently, material, too.
I perhaps should not omit to say that the materi-
ality of mind, in addition to all this, is implied in the
very definition of matter which Dr. Cams accepts. In
"Fundamental Problems," p. 93, he defines matter
as " that which affects our senses," and, in " The Soul
of Man," p. 383, as "anything which can effect one
or more of our senses." Affecting our senses is a pro-
cess the product of which is perception, or what psy-
chologists generally misname sensation, a psychical
product at all events, in whose production the affec-
tion consists ; so that matter, in affecting our senses,
acts on mind
—
produces feeling
—
gives rise to con-
sciousness : and, as causation is transformation, the
mental effect of this action must be equally material
with the action itself, reacting on matter, and setting
up therewith the interaction which belongs exclu-
sively to material things. It is an obvious suggestion
that perception or sensation is merely the sequent of
material action, instead of the effect ; but, if matter
does not produce sensation, so called, it does not af-
fect our senses in the established acceptation of the
phrase, for this affection consists purely in the produc-
tion of sensation. An object unperceived is not con-
sidered, popularly or philosophically, as affecting our
senses. An impression that stops short of the senso-
rium is not a sensory impression ; so long as the " pro-
cess" does not emerge in consciousness, it falls short
of sensation—is physical, not psychical ; and this is
true of subconscious or subliminal activities and pas-
sivities of every kind. Consciousness is the essence
of sensation, as of mental phenomena at large. This
observation opens a field into which at present I can-
not properly enter.
Having produced this argument to the man or the
school, I ask briefly to make one other, more espe-
cially ad hominem, prefacing it with the remark of
Professor Hoffding, who therein but vouches for a
self-evident truth, that "the conception function (in
the physiological sense) implies, just as much as the
conception matter or product, something presented as
an object of intuition in the form of space." Dr.
Carus, in one of his chapters in "The Soul of Man,"
talks about localising consciousness, and actually
suggests that the hemispheric ganglions known as the
Striped Body constitute the organ of consciousness
;
whereby he concedes, unequivocally, I need not say,
that consciousness is not only the function of a mate-
rial organ, but the product of motion, wherein the
functioning of a material organ consists': whence it
follows, beyond question, not merely that motion can
be transformed into consciousness, but that both are
material. Quod erat NON demonstrandu?n. But this
argument, and its fellow, I throw in for good measure
;
my intention is not to baffle criticism, but to elicit
truth.
Such is my position—the citadel from which I as-
sail the monism of Dr. Carus. This position Dr. Carus
has not attacked. He has neither stormed it nor be-
sieged it. He has not so much as summoned it to
surrender. He has not come in sight of it ; although
the shrill note of his fifes, and the rubadub of his
drums, announce that he is vigorously marching and
counter- marching somewhere in the rear. I respect-
fully challenge him to show himself. Where does he
stand ? Does he accept my account of the material ?
Does he reject the inconceivability of the negation of
a proposition* as the ultimate test of its truth ? Does
he doubt that causation is transformation? Does he
deny that an event on which another is invariably and
unconditionally consequent is the cause of the other ?
Does he admit or refuse to admit the canon of induc-
tion respecting concomitant variations?
Dr. Carus would seem to have a peculiar notion of
the properties of matter—a kind of dissolving notion,
which passes insensibly from one notion into another,
as he changes his point of view. From the point he
occupied when he made this reply, he appears to re-
*I mean a simple and legitimate proposition—one tlia
thought, and cannot be decomposed.
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gard the properties of matter as a group of coordinate
abstractions, of which matter itself is one among the
rest. He says :
" If we speak of matter we do not mean force. If we speak
of force, we do not mean matter. If we speak of form, we mean
nothing but relation. If we speak of consciousness, or of feeling,
or of thought, we have no reference to either matter, or force, or
even form. All these terms are different abstractions of one and
the same indivisible reality. . . . The thing moved is material, but
the motion itself is not material."
If we speak of matter, we may with propriety mean
its properties, whereby we know it, and of which, in
the order of thought, force not only is the first, but
comprehends the others. When we speak of matter,
if we do not mean force, we can mean nothing else
than matter in itself, which Dr. Carus says is a non-
entity. If he speaks of matter, and does not mean
force, therefore, he means nothing.
Force, motion, and the rest, are properties of mat-
ter ; but that the properties of a thing partake of its
nature is a corollary from the definition of properties.
Besides, matter is manifested in its properties, and if
these are immaterial it must be immaterial itself; so
that either matter does not exist, or its properties,
with their effects (to the remotest and finest issues),
are material. Dr. Carus, indeed, if I understand him,
holds that the properties of a thing, as they are known
to us, constitute the thing; wherefore, the absurdity of
holding that the properties of matter are immaterial
should be especially manifest to him. But in this
view of properties I do not concur.
Dr. Carus says "Every reality is material," which
is saying that everything real, subjective or objec-
tive, is material, for to say that anything is real,
without being a realitv, is to say that it is real without
the state of being real, which in turn is to say that it
is real without being real. Unless Dr. Carus is pre-
pared to accept this contradiction, he must give up
the notion that there is any difference in extension be-
tween real and reality—that real may be applied to that
of which ./-^rtZ/Vji' cannot be predicated; the extension
of real, if the tautology may be pardoned, is exactly
measured by the objects to which it belongs, whereof
all, by virtue solely of the quality it names, are realities.
The proposition " Everything real is material, " and the
proposition "Every reality is material," are identical
beyond dispute— self-evidently the self-same. Escape
from this conclusion is a logical impossibility. So far,
so good. But here comes the difficulty. Dr. Carus,
in the reply under notice, says with some "feeling,"
if not "force": "To declare that force, and feeling,
and consciousness, and thought, are material does not
prove the boldness of freethought, it betrays an imma-
ture mind." This is intended to be rough on some-
body, and it obviously is, but the somebody, I shudder
to relate, turns out to be the author of it. The killing
remark puts one in mind of McFingal's gun, which,
" Aimed at duck or plover,
Bore wide, and knocked the owner over."
This is the difficulty. That it is an awkward one Dr.
Carus will probably own, though he may imagine (his
imagination seems abnormal in some directions) that
he can manage somehow to right himself, without re-
tracting the admission that has wronged him. Any-
how, I resign the situation into his hands, with cheer-
fulness, and the best of good wishes.
Dr. Carus never wearies of repeating that matter
is an abstraction; as if that were a common clincher.
Matter is an abstraction, if, from his standpoint or one
of his standpoints, we consider it as the raw stuff of
material things, marking them off from immaterial
things, though, even in this view, it symbolizes a real-
ity ; but if, from another and juster standpoint of his,
we grant that "every reality is material," then matter
is coextensive with reality— is the All—and of course
is not abstracted from anything, or possessed by any-
thing. Matter is an abstraction in the view of super-
naturalism only— in that of immaterialism it does not,
speaking logically, exist at all ; in the view of material-
ism, the idea that matter is an abstraction drawn from
things, or' inhering in them, is the contradiction of
contradictions: matter, in the materialistic view, is it-
self the sum total of things—absolute, infinite, tran-
scendent.
For my part, I conceive the universe as arising
from one element, whereof the mental symbol is what
we call matter, and of which the thing we call force
symbolises the primary attribute, whereby are evolved
all the complexer elements, with their properties, and,
through these, the universe as we know it, mind in-
cluded : all of which, mind not excepted, is resolvable
into the original element. The world is a tree of which
mind is the blossom and fiuit.
This is monism, as I understand it. What Dr.
Carus understands as monism, it appears to me, is al-
most any ism under the sun, except monism. I reckon
it a flat self-contradiction. It is a burlesque on monism,
unless I mistake both, though a good specimen of
dualism—better, if anything, than that of Zoroaster
himself, for Light and Darkness may be conceived as
shading into each other, and, moreover, in the Persian
conception, they have immateriality in common ; but
the monism of Dr. Carus lacks this shadow of unity.
Yet I am open to reason. If he will demonstrate that
two things having nothing in common are the same
thing, I will cheerfully accept the demonstration ;
wherever truth leads, I am ready to follow, be it into
the jaws of the absurdest-looking paradox. But the
demonstration has not yet come forth. Nor does it
seem forthcoming.
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Prof. Hoffding, who agrees with Dr. Carus in as-
serting the inconvertibility of mind and matter, essays
to unify the two by referring both to some tcrtium quid,
of which he supposes that they are parallel manifesta-
tions. This unification of them, however, abandons
their essential heterogeneity, for things that are homo-
geneous with the same thing are homogeneous with
each other; and this result must attend every possible
mode of real unification. The parallels cannot be made
identical at either end without becoming identical
throughout, when they cease to be two, and are one
and the same. Dn Carus himself reaches this result
by a short turn. "The simplest conception of the
case," he says, "is the monistic view, which considers
the parallelism an identity,"* subjoining : " Fechner
seems to have hit the mark, when he compared feeling
and motion to the inside and the outside curves of a
circle." This conception is certainly simple, in one
sense (which it is unnecessary to unfold), but bewil-
deringly intricate in another. If the two manifesta-
tions are identical, they are not different, far less so
different as to have nothing in common ; the only
trouble, as well as I can perceive, is that their individ-
ual identity leaves the world devoid of one or the other
of them, and it is not easy to see how the world can
get on without both. But this curious monistic puzzle
I hand over to the reader.
The whole question raised by it, as it seems to me,
maybe put into a nutshell. Mind and matterf are fun-
damentally the same or fundamentally different. If
fundamentally the same, they are interconvertible
;
and monism is established. If fundamentally different,
they are not interconvertible ; but monism is exploded.
Either way Dr. Carus is fundamentally wrong. If this
reasoning is fallacious, in his opinion, I invite him to
expose its fallacy— I seek the truth at all hazards ; but
he will make no head in this direction, by talking
around the point, instead of to it, or splitting hypo-
thetical hairs in the face of "unwedgeable and gnarled"
facts.
Dr. Carus suggests (though the body of his reply
hardly bears out the suggestion) that the difference
between him and myself is "primarily a difference of
reasoning rather than of opinion," adding, with en-
gaging frankness, though scarcely with his usual lu-
cidity, that I overlook "the fundamental rules of phil-
osophical propaedeutics, and this oversight produces,
as a secondary symptom, a difference of opinion."
Concerning the first part of this suggestion, I will say
nothing
; but, as for the latter and more learned part,
if he is right in his diagnostics, and would have his
prognostics indicate our agreement, I advise him, in
the immortal figure of Captain Cuttle, to overhaul his
propaedeutics, and, when found, make a note of.
"Whereby, why not? " That important branch of his
mental equipment will evidently be none the worse for
a very thorough overhauling. Meantime, I rest con-
tent in my "opinion," and am not disturbed about
my "philosophical propaedeutics." Propaedeutics,
philosophical or otherwise, may be judged by the fruit-
age. The end crowns all.
» The Soul ofMan, p. 20.
t The word matter I of cc
3 of the forms of matter in
in the popular sense—as signifying
ve to be the true sense.
MONISM OR MATERIALISM.
We must protest from the beginning against Mr.
Shipman's calling hxs, a.x\\c\& Motiism and Materialism
"a Rejoinder." The article is no rejoinder. Mr.
Shipman criticised The Open Court's view of monism
from the materialistic standpoint in several articles
published in Secular Thought. We replied to his criti-
cism in the same journal in an article entitled " The
Error of Materialism." This article was reprinted in
The Open Court, we saw another reprint of the article
introduced by a few editorial remarks in The Reform
Advocate. If Mr. Shipman's article were a rejoinder,
it ought to appear in Secular Thought. We see no
obligation to publish it, especially as we received it
many months after the controversy. Yet we do not
wish that any cause be insufficiently represented in The
Open Court, nor that the cause which we plead should
unduly enjoy the editorial advantages.
Mr. Shipman's present article, is a most vigorous
attack couched in strong language, and displaying at
the same time an almost enviable consciousness of
triumphant superiority. That is the reason we have
accepted it for publication,—for thus it becometh us
to fulfil all righteousness. The present reply shall be
brief in order to avoid the wearisomeness of repetition.
*
* *
I have said it before and I say it again that the dis-
agreement between Mr. Shipman and myself is "pri-
marily a difference of reasoning rather than opinion ; he
overlooks the fundamental rules of philosophical propae-
deutics and this oversight produces as a secondary
symptom a difference of opinion." He declares that
mind is material, to which I answer: "If mind were
material. We might not only weigh it and measure it
as we weigh sugar and measure cloth, but we might
also bottle it and preserve it in tin cans."
In the present article Mr. Shipman comes and at-
tempts to prove the materiality of the mind. He says :
" [Mind] is the effect of the activity of organised matter ; and
as every effect is consubstantial with its cause, the effect of ma-
teria! activity is itself material,"
Could anything be a better proof than this, that
there is a difference of reasoning between Mr. Ship-
man and myself ?
I object to the maxim that the effect must be con-
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substantial with its cause. For instance, the hunter
shoots a deer and it dies. The shooting is the cause,
the deer's death the effect. Some people who cannot
distinguish between the act of shooting and the ball
shot, say the ball is the cause, and then argue, the
cause being material, the effect must be material too.
But if the effect must be consubstantial with its cause,
the deer's death ought to consist of lead. It ought to
be exactly the same material. But there is no sense
in calling any material thing a cause, and still less in
saying that cause and effect are consubstantial.
The activity of a material body is not material it-
self. Activity is motion and motion is change of place.
He who maintains that the motion of a piece of matter
is material, that the act of changing the place of a piece
of matter is itself a piece of matter, is in possession
of such a peculiar kind of logic that I can no longer
argue with him. His logic may appear to him from
his standpoint as a hyperlogic which is not bound to
respect the usual rules of logic, but it is and remains
radically different from mine.
Suppose we find out on the ground of physiological
facts (as I have tried to do in "The Soul of Man,")
that a certain part of the brain is the organ of con-
sciousness. Does that prove the materiality of con-
sciousness because it is granted that the brain is ma-
terial? We might just as well say that the clock, viz.,
the instrument of measuring time, is material, and that,
therefore, measuring time is material. It would further
follow that time itself is material also. I should like
to know whether any chemist has ever succeeded in
analysing this queer piece of matter, called time!
According to Mr. Shipman, everything that exists
is matter. He believes in "the coextension of matter
with reality"; and he objects also to a discrimination
between adjectives and nouns, between " matter " and
"material," "reality" and "real." The terms "real"
and "reality" are by no means coextensive, nor are the
terms "matter" and "material" coextensive. I should
not hesitate to say that reality is material, i. e. every
concrete existence possesses a quality which affects the
senses and which is called material. Reality as a whole
in so far as it is or can be perceived by the senses con-
sists of matter. Even ghosts, if there are any, would
have at least pro tem to be materialised in order to
appear. But reality possesses other qualities too which
are not material. So for instance a dog consists of mat-
ter, he is material. But he possesses also a special
form, which makes of him a poodle or a spitz. More-
over he is sentient, he has feelings. And neither the
forms nor the feelings of a dog are matter.
Is it so difficult to understand that all our abstract
words, such as matter, form, feeling, etc., have been
abstracted from reality? Matter is not the whole of
reality but a certain feature of it. What a confusion
must arise, if we call everything and anything matter!
But such is the materialism of Mr. Shipman. We
might with the same reason call everything spirit and
on that ground call ourselves spiritualists.
Considering the fact that Mr. Shipman's reasoning
follows a peculiar method of its own unintelligible ac-
cording to the customary rules of logic, it is not at all
strange that he is unable to understand the monistic
conception which considers subjectivity and objectivity
as not being the same but one.
We say, and in this we are in agreement with many
prominent thinkers and psychologists of modern times,
viz. with Fechner, Clifford, Wundt, Lewes, Ribot, Hoff-
ding, Lloyd Morgan, and others, that a feeling is not
a motion and a motion is not a feeling ; they are dif-
ferent and not interconvertible. Yet a certain feeling
and a certain motion (viz. certain nervous actions of
the brain) are one, being the subjective and objective
aspects of one and the same reality.
Mr. Shipman is unable to see that such a view is
monistic ; he declares that I "set duality in the atom."
I wish Mr. Shipman would leave the atom alone and
speak of atoms only when we discuss chemical ques-
tions. As to the duality, I do not see why a curve
should be called dual because it is said to be concave
on the one side and convex on the other side. No
mathematician will consider concavity and convexity
as identical, nor will he, by making this distinction,
have " to set duality " in the curve itself. The curve it
self remains one although it possess two sides that
are quite different from one another.
If after these explanations Mr. Shipman and my-
self cannot come to an understanding, I feel satisfied
that at least each of us has had a chance of setting
forth his view clearly. Our readers are the umpires,
who according to their taste may choose between mate-
rialism and monism—or if they please, form some
other Ism of their own. p. c.
THE SUNSET CLUB ON THE WAY TO UPLIFT THE
MASSES.
BY M. M. TRUMBULL.
It was ladies night at the Sunset Club on the 4th of February,
and accordingly the attendance was very large, five hundred and
seventy men and women being present at the banquet in the big
dining hall of the Grand Pacific Hotel. Miss Frances Willard
presided, and the topic was, " How would you uplift the masses ?"
The most effective speeches were made by women, spiritually and
mentally strong, absurdly forbidden by law to take any political
part in the work of social uplifting, which never can be completed
without their political aid.
Mrs. J. M. Flower opened the debate, and in a very womanly
way began to uplift the masses by giving them a good washing in
the first place, then some food, and then some clothes. Her social
trinity appeared to be soap, flour, and cloth, the triune elements
of good and happy life. Dirt, rags, and hunger were the danger-
ous microbes corrupting our social constitution and filling the
body politic with disease. Expressed in Mrs. Flower's osvn Ian-
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guage, "Spirituality is incompatible with a craving stomach, and
the best mind can be stunted by insufficient bodily nourishment."
Therefore she "would begin the work of uplifting the masses by
improving physical conditions, and especially the conditions of
child life." She would uplift the masses by making law and jus-
tice synonymous ; she would enforce the laws against trusts ; and
against child labor. She would improve the habitations of the
poor, equalise taxation, establish public baths, and multiply the
schools.
For charity in the form of almsgiving Mrs. Flower had only
censure. She declared that almsgiving "acts detrimentally on
both giver and receiver by quieting the conscience of the one, and
by supplying the physical needs of the other at the expense of his
independence and self-respect." Instead of alms, Mrs. Flower
would give justice. This doctrine, for which I hold myself in
some degree responsible, contains a grain of truth and a shipload
of error. I am now convinced that it is unsound and at least mis-
leading. Several years ago, in a moment of enthusiastic passion,
I said in the "Wheelbarrow" papers that the toilers " ask not
charity, but justice"; and ever since I said it the echo of it has
been coming back to me in sentiments like those uttered by Mrs.
Flower at the Sunset Club. Placing those two sublime virtues in
antithesis was a mistake ; I ought to have demanded for them
"charity ««;/ justice."
I wish I could stop the spiritual degeneration which the senti-
ment is making, because if it continues we shall see the time when
the poor will get neither charity nor justice. If less charity made
more justice, the position taken by Mrs. Flower would be invin-
cible ; but the very opposite is true. A study of her own acquaint-
ances will convince her that the men and women most conspicuous
for charity are the most inclined to justice. While we are waiting
for justice let us go on with the charity, vs^ith discriminate charity,
I mean, for God loveth a cheerful giver. " It is in the scriptures.
Trim "!
While some of Mrs, Flower's projects of reform were gener-
ous wishes and aspirations merely, and while she relied a little too
securely on the coercive power of governments, the majority of
her plans were within the scope of social effort and practical
statesmanship. Indeed it would be well if our professional states-
men understood our political needs as intelligently as Mrs. Flower
does. Of course there is a suggestion of Utopia in those impos-
sible courts "where politics will not rule, and where law and jus-
tice will be synonymous and within the reach of all "; but there
was practical politics in her demand that the burdens of govern-
ment be more fairly distributed ; and there was good morals in the
contempt she threw upon that system which "taxes the poor man
earning his scanty living with his cheap horse and cart, as much
on his slim equipment as his rich neighbor on his five thousand
dollar turnout." Mrs Flower did well to ridicule that. To fine
a man for earning his living with a horse and cart is a travesty and
caricature of government.
Dr. E. G. Hirsch was the next speaker, and with rare felicity
of expression he showed how strong the temptation was to pre-
scribe some favorite and infallible panacea, education, statutes,
charity, temperance, or something else. "With one medicine,''
said Dr. Hirsch, "the disease cannot be reached. To lift up the
masses it is necessary before all to unmass them." He then
showed wherein lay the hope and chance of doing it.
According to Dr. Hirsch, before we can uplift the masses we
must restore to man his individuality. The massing of men was
due to the invention of machinery and the introduction of steam,
whereby " men who had to earn their living by the work of their
bands were deprived of all individuality." House industries gave
way to the factory system which "reduced men and women to
the level of mere hands." Following out this train of thought,
|
Dr. Hirsch said, "the factory makes it essential that all wage
workers shall live in the neighborhood of the great industrial es-
tablishments." The result of this is the tenement abomination,
where privacy and healthy development are alike impossible. The
value of privacy and room to grow was illustrated by this fine
comparison, "As the body requires a certain minimum of cubic
feet of fresh air, so the soul, using this term to cover all the func-
tions of man's moral nature, needs at least some space which can-
not be invaded by any other person."
It seemed like a poetical dream, but the hope of Dr. Hirsch
lay in the development of electricity as a mechanical power,
whereby home industries may be restored, and men again become
whole persons instead of bits of a machine. There was so much glow
of human feeling in his words, that ideal as his prophecy appeared
to be, it was impossible not to wish that it might be fulfilled. He
said, " The age of steam is passing away. Electricity is the force
of the future. It is my conviction that it offers the possibility of
reviving the old house industries, allowing room for individuality,
and allowing the workers to live comfortably, not in the crowded
hovels of the city, but in the laughing homes of healthy suburbs."
Eloquent and animated as Dr. Hirsch was, the realisation of his
hope is too far distant, even if possible at all. Something must
be done to uplift the masses now.
Mr. George A. Schilling followed Dr. Hirsch, and promptly
made a claim that the question itself conceded that the masses
were down, and that they might be lifted up by human agencies.
If the masses are oppressed, he said, there must be something
that oppresses them. He averred that merely social and private
remedies such as charity, prohibition, and similar expedients were
inadequate ; and he contended that the problem was one of justice
in the realm of economics. He would uplift the masses by setting
them free, and he contended that they were under a form of sla-
very by duress of hunger, cold, the fear of the future, and the
love for wife and children which compelled them to sell them-
selves in the labor market for whatever they would bring. It was
not the chattel slavery of old, but it was a form of moral slavery
which ought to be abolished.
Mr. Schilling's argument had the merit of specific statement,
and his remedies were three, the abolition of land monopoly, of
money monopoly, and the monopoly of patents. Legalised privilege
concrete in those monopolies was responsible for what Mr. Schil-
ling called " the exploitation of labor." He would abolish all land
laws, and make occupancy and use the sole title to land, thus
" restoring to the masses those natural opportunities and resources
upon which their energies may be employed." There is a high
purpose in all that, but I fear the scheme is impossible, at least in
this geological epoch. It is doubtless true that land monopoly is
a grievance that ought to be abated ; it may be also true that nat-
ural resources, the inheritance of all the people, are locked up
from the masses by the privileged few, whereby the productive
power of nature is abridged, and agriculture oppressed with heavy
burdens, but I fear the scheme of Mr. Schilling would abolish
agriculture altogether. Men will not cultivate land unless they can
read their title clear to a certain quantity of it described by metes
and bounds. Title by use and occupancy alone is too precarious
to justify a man in ploughing land or planting it ; in fencing it, or
building a barn on it. Security of title is the foundation of agri-
culture ; and agriculture is the support of every other industry.
The other social remedies proposed by Mr. Schilling, the Mutual
Bank, and the Abolition of the Patent Monopoly, I will refer to
at some future time.
Miss Addams of Hull House came next ; and the appearance of
this young lady created a sensation that will not soon be forgotten
by the Sunset Club. Hull House, now famous because of Miss
Addams, is conspicuous over there in Darkest Chicago, a mansion
owned by that lady, where for the past five years the masses have
been actually uplifted through her unostentatious work, and largely
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at her own expense. Not many of those present had ever seen
Miss Addams, bat evidently all had heard of her, for as soon as
her name was announced, and she rose to speak, the audience rec-
ognised at once that the greatest woman in Chicago stood before
them, and the applause was a magnificent and spontaneous tribute
of. respect. It could not be suppressed, but broke out again and
again. It lasted for several minutes, to the embarrassing surprise
of Miss Addams, which almost broke her down, but the cheering
was a testimonial unmistakable that her good deeds had found
her out.
The address of Miss Addams was of wonderful strength and
quality. It was democracy set to music, and the religion of social
equality inspired every word. The description of Hull House as a
social force was condensed and very clear ; Miss Addams said :
" The Social Settlement of which Hull House claims to be a mod-
est example is an attempt to know the 'masses' as one neighbor
knows another neighbor. The residents of such Settlement live
among the masses as nearly as possible without a sense of differ-
ence. They claim to have added the social function to democ-
racy,"
The purpose expressed in that sentiment appears to me to be
the most morally scientific solution of the social problem that has
yet appeared. It reminds me of the democracy of Robert Burns,
wherein the principle of social equality forms its most essential
part. The poor, having political rights without social equality,
'
' meet in a saloon, " says Miss Addams, ' ' their only host a barten-
der, and a local demagogue forms their political opinions." Nor,
according to Miss Addams, is this equality necessary for the eleva-
tion of the poor only, but also for that "fast growing number of
so-called ' favored ' young people who have no recognised outlet
for their active faculties." This somewhat startling doctrine Miss
Addams made beautifully clear.
Into educational matters also. Miss Addams would put social
as well as political democracy, and this is the style of education
obtained at Hull House. How many hundreds of years it has
taken to find out what some of us would not have discovered for
hundreds of years to come had it not been shown to us by Miss
Addams, that, "people who have been allowed to remain unde-
veloped, and whose faculties are inert and sterile, cannot take
their learning heavily. It has to be diffused in a social atmos-
phere. Information held in solution in a medium of fellowship
and good will can be assimilated by the dullest." There is enough
genial warmth in that sort of talk to thaw out a good deal of our
natural stupidity, and make learning easier to get.
I would gladly quote a little more from the speech of Miss
Addams, but Lady Henry Somerset spoke well too, and with ad-
mirable grace and elegance. Her speech was magnetic with hu-
man sympathy, and very much in the strain made so attractive by
Miss Addams. Lady Henry Somerset is President of the Woman's
Christian Temperance Union of Great Britain, and in addition to
the duties of that office, she performs a work very much like that
performed at Hull House. Familiar with the palaces of Belgravia
and the slums of Whitechapel there was much valuable instruction
in what Lady Somerset said. Her comparison between the social
phenomena of England, and those of the United States was valu-
able. It was kindly said, but there was a solemn warning to Amer-
icans in this parallel : "Your problems here, it seems to me, are
simpler in some measure, because your evils cannot surely have
taken such deep root in your social system ; but superficially
speaking, I should say that you are meeting to-day exactly the
same spectres with which we are grappling in the old world."
Like Miss Addams, Lady Somerset proclaimed the elevating
tendency of social democracy upon the masses and the classes too.
She expressed the sentiment in a picturesque and vivid way, say-
ing, "There is deep rooted in the minds of men and women a
sense that what we have to give is not all that we think it is. We
want to bring before them little by little the feeling that they must
raise themselves. The moment we attempt to put our hand down
or to lift it up, I believe all effort is useless. We need to hold out
the level palm and say, ' Greeting to you ray brother and my sis-
ter ' And only that which comes in this spirit, whether we deal
with the great problems or whether it is in our social relations,
will tell for good when we seek, as we call it, to uplift the masses."
There were other speeches and good ones too, that I should
like to review, but my comments are already too long.
CORRESPONDENCE.
THE ETHICAL SOCIETIES AND THE CRITERION OF
ETHICS.
To the Editor of The Open Court :
Your recent criticism* of the ethical culturists seems to me to
be very praiseworthy, opportune, and pertinent. It is about time
that this sailing of the sea without a compass or chart which is
claimed to be the scientific method of ethical culture societies were
pointed out as ««scientific and by no means consistent with the
modern spirit of criticism and the rationalising efforts to get at and
maintain the possible criterion for conduct or the basis for and the
existence of the ethical formula. If we are to be guided by ethical
culturists what surety have we that our work, teaching, conduct,
is right ? If there is or can be no common unit of truth among
men built on the conception of the reality and existence of truth
itself—truth which as law predestinates not only the human will
but determines the rationale and method of conduct, then what
ground for positive ethics or authority for right and wrong con-
duct have we ? Will our ethical co-workers say none at all ! If so,
how do they know this ? Will they please oblige us by explaining
their reasons for this agnosticism ? On the general assumption by
them that there is a method in the universe—that the universe is
this method, perhaps; why then could not it be formulated, if
truth can at all be arrived at, even if the masses should not see it.
Is truth to wait before man formulates it, if he can, until humanity
is ready to see and accept it ? It strikes any fair mind that our
ethical culturists, are not sure of their ethics or the authority for
the same or they would not be so modest and timid about seeking
with the rest of us for the only possible criterion for truth, and be
so arbitrary and absurd in their belief that because they refuse to
be scientific, the other thinkers who differ with them are like the
foolish ostrich who knew it all. J. C. F. Grumbine.
BOOK REVIEWS.
Linguistic Essays. By Carl Abel. London: Triibner & Co.
This volume of essays is intended as a contribution towards
rendering philology a comparative conceptology of nations, with
which object a systematic attempt is made " to realise the psycho-
logical significance of the dictionary, and to connect dictionary
and grammar by conceptual ties." The meaning of words is ex-
plained in groups, each conveying a complete view of a particular
notion, and the ordinary mode of discussing grammatical subjects
by parts of speech, is supplemented by a classification of inflec-
tions and their syntactical combinations according to what they
express. The larger part of the work treats of language as the
embodiment of a nation's general views of men and things, and
the author has brought together some very acute observations on
this topic. For example, in the essay on "Language as the Ex-
pression of National Modes of Thought," he compares the ideas
conveyed by the German word Frcund and the French word ntni,
tracing the difference between them to the different ideas enter-
tained by the peoples who speak those languages in relation to
friendship. In France so slight is the pathos bound up with this
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sentiment, that not only people habitually address each other by
the term ami in the trivial intercourse of everyday life, but mere
acquaintances call each other amis. On the other hand, "the
German scarcely ever says to his friend, Meiii Freund. The word
denotes too sacred a bond to be lightly used. Only in earnest or
excited moments are Germans moved by this lofty name to con-
fess, confirm, or appeal to their intimate relation to each other."
Thus the difference in the meaning of the two terms is significant
of the difference in the character of the peoples to whom they be-
long. To this may be added that the German word has preserved
a memory of the time when among many peoples, as it still is with
some of the Sclavs, the bond of friendship was considered the most
sacred of all ties.
Dr. Abel's second essay is entitled ' ' The Conception of Love
in Some Ancient and Modern Languages," and it contains much
curious matter relating to this interesting subject. The languages
compared are Hebrew, Latin, English, and Russian, and in sum-
marising the results the author states that the strength of the He-
brew is shown in the recognition of the love of God to man, the
love of man to God, and the common love of men to one another;
Latin is distinguished by accentuating obligatory love, inspired by
attachment to family, tribe, and country ; in English there is " a
noble and intelligent development of the concept in all its various
aspects " ; while Russian has in addition a word peculiar to itself
for the different varieties of active love. The religious temperament
of the Russians is shown by the fact that their language alone of
those compared has a word, blagost, which expresses ' ' the love of
God to man. universal, all-embracing love."
We must pass over the elaborate study of the eleven English
words of command, and succeeding essays, until we come to that
which treats on the Origin of Language, which is the subject of
most general importance. The author's views as to the origin of
language are the result of a study of ancient Egyptian, which pos-
sesses certain remarkable features distinctive of really primitive
speech. In the more ancient hieroglyphic period Egyptian was
largely a language of homonyms, one sound or a combination of
sounds being used to denote a variety of things. IVIoreover, there
was the opposite practice of expressing one idea by any one of
many sounds or combinations of sounds. Such a language when
written would appear to be unintelligible, and it would be so largely,
if it were not that, with the exception of certain well understood
grammatical abstracts, every word in an inscription is accompanied
by a supplementary picture. Dr. Abel draws the inference that
gesture and facial expression must have occupied in the spoken
tongue the place which elucidatory drawings had in the written
language. He says " but half understood as such, primitive speech
required to be supplemented by and interpreted by the intelligible
motion of the body, the signal given by the head, hand, or leg, the
impression conveyed by nod, shrug, wink, glance, or leer." The
study made within the last few years of gesture language confirms
the truth of these remarks. Probably hieroglyphics were origin-
ally intended to be pictorial illustrations of gesture language itself,
in which case they would be only indirectly representative of the
written words. An advanced stage is marked by the appearance
of words definite in meaning and distinct in sound, in place of the
numerous homonyms and synonyms, a change which was attended
by a corresponding development of the sense of hearing, and the
power of definite speech. Similar linguistic phenomena are ob-
servable in a close examination of the Aryan and Semitic families
of languages. The use of numerous words for the same object,
and the application of the same word to different ideas oppobes
the hypothesis "that speech began as an outburst of uniform in-
spiration, or that the distinct linguistic sense which to-day connects
sound and meaning, had any original existence." What happened,
says Dr. Abel, was "the gradual development within rationally
confined boundaries of the faculty of appropriating distinct sounds
for distinct concepts." Nevertheless this would seem only to throw
the difficulty further back unless, as is very improbable, sounds
were used almost haphazard to denote many different objects or
ideas. Possibly ancient Egypt was populated by a conglomeration
of tribes each of which contributed to the common language,
which would require gesture to make it properly understood.
Hieroglyphics would thus occupy the same position as the Chinese
written characters, which are read by various peoples whos^e spoken
languages are totally different from one another.
But ancient Egyptian had other remarkable features, among
them the inversion either of sound or of sense, or of both. The
author's Coptic Researches contain ninety pages of such inversions
and the explanation he gives of them appears reasonable. As to
the case of inversion of meaning he shows that it must have been
intentional, and that it was due to the primitive practice of think-
ing by thesis and antithesis, in order to facilitate the comprehen-
sion of either of the opposed conceptions. Arabic furnishes many
examples of this polar change of meaning, which we would suggest
is probably connected with the fact that thought itself is in many
cases antithetic. The CMplanation of inversions of sound is dif-
ferent. Egyptian roots are almost always capable of development
by repetition of the initial consonant at the beginning or end of
the word, or by the repetition of the terminal consonant at the
end. When the initial consonant is repeated at the end, a slightly
emphasised pronunciation will produce a complete inversion of the
root, added to itself, and the idea expressed by the reduplicated
whole will come to be likewise expressed by each of its constituent
parts. Dr. Abel accounts for such inversions as "simply instances
of the full play given to the speech-making faculty in the first
glorious flush of its exuberant spring." He gives various exam-
ples of them in the Indo-European tongues, and it is known that
they are frequent in languages of a more primitive type. We can-
not do more than mention the essay on "Coptic Intensification,"
which is one of the most valuable studies in a work every part of
which is deserving of careful perusal. \l.
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